

Message Text

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 08151 01 OF 03 131228Z
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AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BELGRADE 8151

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR FR YO
SUBJ: GISCARD VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA

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PAGE 02 BELGRA 08151 01 OF 03 131228Z

REF: PARIS 36091

1. SUMMARY: GOY WENT ALL OUT TO HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANCE OF GISCARD'S DEC 6-7 STATE VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA AND STRESS THE DEPTH OF TRADITIONAL YUGOSLAV-FRENCH TIES. MEDIA PLAY WAS IMMENSE. WARMTH AND FRIENDSHIP DISPLAYED BY THE YUGOSLAVS CLEARLY OVERSHADOWED LACK OF SUBSTANCE EMANATING FROM THE VISIT. TREATMENT ACCORDED TO GISCARD VISIT IS SEEN AS BALANCING THAT ACCORDED BREZHNEV. FRENCH HERE STATE THAT AMONG MAJOR RESULTS WAS AGREEMENT FOR BOTH SIDES TO SEEK COMPROMISE AT CIEC. SEVERAL SECTIONS OF COMMUNIQUE SUGGEST EXTENT TO WHICH GOY DESIRED THE VISIT. YUGOSLAVS TEMPORARILY HAD TO SET ASIDE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT AND TO ACKNOWLEDGE FREEDOM TO BE MEMBER OF "MILITARY OR POLITICAL ALLIANCE." CONSIDERING LENGTH OF COMMUNIQUE, ONLY OTHER "CONCRETE" RESULT, CERTAINLY AS PERCEIVED FROM BELGRADE, WAS GENERAL STRENGTHENING OF BILATERAL RELATIONS (WITH EMPHASIS ON INCREASED POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND PERHAPS SOME ECONOMIC FALLOUT). TITO ATTENDED ALL THE REQUIRED FUNCTIONS AND APPEARED FIT. END SUMMARY.

2. SYMBOLISM OF FIRST VISIT BY A FRENCH PRESIDENT TO YUGOSLAVIA WITH RESULTANT INJECTION OF VIGOR INTO YUGOSLAV-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP WAS PERHAPS PRINCIPAL HIGHLIGHT OF GISCARD'S VISIT TO BELGRADE. GOY PULLED OUT ALL STOPS AND CRAMMED THE TWO-DAY SCHEDULE WITH AN EXHAUSTING ROUND OF MEETINGS AND AFFAIRS. TITO AND GISCARD MET THREE TIMES, ONCE PRIVATELY FOR 90 MINUTES, PERHAPS TO OFFSET PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN TITO AND BREZHNEV. THEY ALSO HELD JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE EARLY EVENING OF SECOND DAY JUST PRIOR TO GISCARD'S DEPARTURE. LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE WAS HIGHLY FAVORABLE AND ENVELOPED ALL OTHER NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. VISIT APPEARED STRONGER ON CEREMONY THAN ON SUBSTANCE AND FRENCH TERMED THE YUGOSLAV HOSPITALITY "EXTRAORDINARY."

3. DESPITE ALMOST TOTAL ABSENCE OF CONCRETE RESULTS, COMMUNIQUE IS AN UNUSUALLY LENGTHY DOCUMENT. ALTHOUGH YUGOSLAVS AS DO FRENCH OFTEN EMPLOY A FLORID LITERARY STYLE TO MASK A VOID, WE ATTRIBUTE LENGTH OF DOCUMENT

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PAGE 03 BELGRA 08151 01 OF 03 131228Z

MORE TO YUGOSLAV NEED TO SHOW BALANCE WITH BREZHNEV VISIT COMMUNIQUE. TIMING AND TREATMENT OF VISIT, IN FACT, STRUCK US AS ATTEMPT TO JUGGLE EAST AND WEST. IN MIDST OF CONTINUING PRESS REPORTS OF FAVORABLE REACTION TO GISCARD VISIT, GLARING HEADLINES IN DEC 10 DAILIES ANNOUNCE MEETING OF LCY PRESIDUM WHICH ASSESSED RESULTS OF BREZHNEV VISIT (SEPTEL), THUS ONCE AGAIN REMINDING READERSHIP OF BALANCE.

4. IN A STATEMENT OF SIX PRINCIPLES, COMMUNIQUE LISTS:
(A) SOLIDARITY AS INDISPENSIBLE TO PEACE; (B) APPLICATION
BY STATES OF UN CHARTER AND CSCE PRINCIPLES IN RELATION
TO OTHERS; (C) FREE CHOICE BY SOVEREIGN STATES TO THEIR
OWN SYSTEMS, FOREIGN POLICIES, "INCLUDING RIGHT TO BE
OR NOT TO BE MEMBERS OF MILITARY OF POLITICAL ALLIANCES
AND TO CHOOSE NONALIGNMENT OR NEUTRALITY"; (D) INALIEN-
ABLE RIGHT OF STATES TO PARTICIPATE EQUALLY IN INTER-
NATIONAL MATTERS IN WHICH THEIR INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED;
(E) EXCLUSION FROM DETENTE OF "ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN
BLOCS...SPHERES OF INTEREST OR ZONES OF INFLUENCE" AS
WELL AS ELIMINATION OF PRESSURES EXERTED ON ANY NATION
AND ABSENCE OF ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS;
AND (G) NEED TO ESTABLISH A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER.

5. TWO SIDES HAILED "POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS" SINCE
SIGNING OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT BUT ESTIMATED THAT "IMPORTANT
PROGRESS IS YET TO BE ACHIEVED." THEY "RESOLVED...
TO WORK FOR EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF ALL
ITS PROVISIONS WITHOUT EXCEPTION," AND STATE THAT ATTAIN-
MENT OF THE FINAL ACT'S AIMS WILL DEPEND ON ADJUSTMENTS
OF THE CONDUCT OF STATES TO CSCE PRINCIPLES, PROGRESS IN
RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, AND "THE EXTENSION OF CONTACTS
BETWEEN PEOPLES AND INDIVIDUALS ON THE CONTINENT."
BELGRADE 77 IS GIVEN PARTICULAR ATTENTION. BOTH SIDES
AGREED THAT DETENTE IS NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONS BETWEEN
BLOCS OF THE GREAT POWERS AND "CANNOT ASSUME ITS FULL
DIMENSION" UNLESS ALL THE CSCE AIMS ARE REALIZED AND
PROGRESS IN IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SPREADS
TO OTHER REGIONS.

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 08151 02 OF 03 131412Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BELGRADE 8151

6. THE PARTIES "REAFFIRMED THE CLOSENESS OF THEIR VIEWS" ON THE MIDDLE EAST THAT ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967 SHOULD BE RETURNED AND ON THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS, "PARTICULARLY TO HAVE A STATE OF THEIR OWN." ON THE MEDITERRANEAN, THEY RECALLED THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN
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PAGE 02 BELGRA 08151 02 OF 03 131412Z

SECURITY AND COOPERATION. COMMUNIQUE HAILS "PRINCIPLE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT...UNDER AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL" AND EXPRESSED THE WISH THAT THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT WILL CONSTRUCTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION.

7. THE TWO UNDERLINE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIEC AND CONSIDERED " THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO INVEST EVERY EFFORT SO THAT THIS CONFERENCE MAY ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."

8. ON BILATERAL MATTERS, THEY STRESSED "INTENTION TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL COOPERATION" MAINLY THROUGH REGULAR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS "AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS." THEY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE EFFORTS TO ENSURE MORE BALANCED INCREASE IN COMMODITY EXCHANGE AND EXPANSION OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION INCLUDING PARTICIPATION

OF FRENCH TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCE IN YUGOSLAV CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT. THEY NOTED OPENING OF POSSIBILITIES OF INCREASED FRENCH INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION IN YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE JOINT VENTURES IN THIRD MARKETS.

9. FRENCH VIEWS: FRENCH COUNSELOR NEMO TOLD EMBOFF THAT VISIT PROMOTED THREE DIMENSIONS OF RELATIONS: EAST-WEST, NORTH-SOUTH, AND BILATERAL. ON FIRST, DENTE WAS ENCOURAGED AND DIFFERENCES IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES WERE RECOGNIZED AS WAS MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY ALLIANCES (FOR FRANCE) OR NON-ALIGNMENT (FOR YUGOSLAVIA). IN TALKS GISCARD EMPHASIZED THE STRENGTHENING OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES WHILE TITO DISCUSSED "MARGINALLY" REINFORCEMENT OF BOTH BLOCS. THE FRENCH WERE PLEASED TO GET YUGOSLAV ENCOURAGEMENT ON NEED FOR MOVEMENT ON ALL LEVELS OF CSCE, PARTICULARLY DIRECT CONTACTS. ON THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, NEMO SAID WHILE "VIEWS WERE NOT IDENTICAL, THEY WERE RATHER PARALLEL." HE REMARKED "THERE WAS CONVERGENCE ON THE NEED TO CONTINUE THE CIEC DIALOGUE AND FIND A COMPROMISE." THE YUGOSLAVS REAFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD SEEK A MODERATE POSITION AND EACH PROMISED TO DO WHATEVER THEY COULD TO MAKE A COMPROMISE POSSIBLE. THE BILATERAL ASPECT STRESSED POLITICAL RELATIONS ALTHOUGH CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 BELGRA 08151 02 OF 03 131412Z

THE YUGOSLAVS WERE EAGER TO PROMOTE MORE ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE GOOD RELATIONS WHICH EXISTED THROUGH MINISTERIAL CONTACTS WERE RAISED TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL. ADDITIONALLY, THE VISIT MAY GIVE SOME "FAVORABLE IMPULSE" TO INCREASING YUGOSLAV EXPORTS TO FRANCE. NEMO SAID VISIT WENT SO SMOOTHLY THAT TITO NOTED DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT DRAFTING OF THE COMMUNIQUE WAS EASIER THAN USUAL.

10. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EC: FIVE DAYS BEFORE GISCARD'S ARRIVAL PRIMIN BIJEDIC AND EC COUNCIL PRESIDENT VAN DER STOEL SIGNED JOINT STATEMENT CALLING FOR IMPROVED YUGOSLAV-EC RELATIONS. YUGOSLAVS WERE PLEASED BY VAN DER STOEL'S VISIT AND EC MEMBER JANKO SMOLE TOLD ECON COUNS GOY EXPECTS THIS POLITICAL STATEMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES WILL HELP YUGOSLAV ENTERPRISES INCREASE THEIR SALES IN EC MEMBER NATIONS. TITO UNDERSCORED THIS POINT WHEN HE SAID DURING TOAST AT THE FIRST NIGHT'S DINNER FOR GISCARD THAT LONG-TERM YUGOSLAV-EC COOPERATION COULD NOTABLY CONTRIBUTE TO NEW PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND FRANCE. COMMUNIQUE EXPRESSES "PARTICULAR SATISFACTION" WITH THE SIGNING OF THE YUGOSLAV-EC DECLARATION. (COMMENT: ON SAME DAY AS PUBLICATION OF EC DECLARATION, INTERVIEW WITH LCY SECRETARY JUNE BILIC ATTACKED THOSE IN

YUGOSLAVIA WHO THINK YUGOSLAVIA'S DESTINY IS TO BE
A "EUROPEAN" NATION. WE SAW SAME BALANCING ACT WHEN LCY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY DOLANC SPREAD WET BLANKET ON SOME ASPECTS
OF BREZHNEV VISIT. THIS IS PART OF GOY METHOD OF KEEPING
THEIR PEOPLE

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 08151 03 OF 03 131433Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BELGRADE 8151

FROM GETTING WRONG IMPRESSIONS.)

1. NON-ALIGNMENT: STRIKINGLY ABSENT FROM COMMUNIQUE
ARE NORMALLY EVER-PRESENT YUGOSLAV PAEANS TO NON-
ALIGNMENT. IN LIGHT OF CRITICISM FRANCE RECEIVED FROM
COLOMBO NAC, FRENCH OPPOSED ANY POSITIVE REFERENCES
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PAGE 02 BELGRA 08151 03 OF 03 131433Z

TO NON-ALIGNMENT AS A CONCEPT. IN HIS BELGRADE TV
INTERVIEW LAST WEEKEND, GISCARD RESPONDING TO QUERY ON
NON-ALIGNMENT MERELY POSED QUESTIONS OF HIS OWN,
REFRAINING FROM UTTERING ANYTHING AFFIRMATIVE ON THE
SUBJECT. YUGOSLAVS HAD TO CONCEDE ON THIS POINT.
COMMUNIQUE POINTS THIS UP BY CONTAINING, BESIDES MENTION
IN PARA 4 ABOVE, LONE REFERENCE TO "THE INDEPENDENCE OF NON-
ALIGNED YUGOSLAVIA." GISCARD MAY HAVE DECIDED TO THROW YUGOSLAVS
A SCRAP WHEN DURING JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE HE REFERRED TO TITO
"WHO IS EXECGING INFLUENCE AMONG ALL NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES,
86 IN NUMBER WHICH CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL
ENTITIES IN WORLD DIPLOMACY." HOWEVER, YUGOSLAVS
HAVE BEGUN TO REWRITE THIS PORTION OF VISIT. "BORBA"
COMMENTATOR VLADO TESLIC IN DECEMBER 9 EDITION WROTE
THAT "ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RESPECT FOR THE NON-ALIGNED
POLICY OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-ALIGNMENT
AS A WORLDWIDE POLICY HAVE, IT SEEMS, CONTRIBUTED
ESSENTIALLY TO THE VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT AND TALKS."
ZAGREB'S "VJESNIK", ON THE SAME DAY, STATED THAT
GISCARD'S VISIT HAS SHOWN "THAT FRANCE IS INTERESTED
IN INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED, SELF-MANAGING AND SOCIALIST
YUGOSLAVIA."

12. YUGOSLAV GUEST WORKERS IN FRANCE: A YUGOSLAV TV
NEWSMAN TOLD AN EMBOFF THAT IN RECENT YEARS SPECIAL
KINSHIP YUGOSLAVS FEEL FOR FRANCE WAS BEGINNING TO ERODE
DUE TO DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT YUGOSLAV GUEST WORKERS
WERE RECEIVING IN FRANCE. WHILE COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT
DEAL WITH SUBJECT, FRENCH SOPKESMAN LECAT, IN DISCUSSING
THE SECOND MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS REMARKED
THAT GISCARD "POINTED TO THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE
WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF YUGOSLAVS TEMPORARILY
EMPLOYED IN FRANCE."

13. GOF AND MARXISM: IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON
MARXISM DURING HIS BELGRADE TV INTERVIEW, GISCARD
STATED "THESE WERE IN VIEWS OF A MAN IN THE SIXTIES
OF THE PAST (19TH) CENTURY, BUT THINGS HAVE CHANGED
SINCE." "POLITIKA" CARRYING ABRIDGED VERSION OF INTER-
VIEW FOLLOWING DAY OMITTED ENTIRE SECTION ON MARXISM.
(WE ARE REMINDED THAT SOVIETS ACTED SIMILARLY REGARDING
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PAGE 03 BELGRA 08151 03 OF 03 131433Z

GISCARD'S COMMENTS ON FRENCH WAGES DURING HIS INTERVIEW
ON MOSCOW TV.)

14. SERBIAN LUNCHEON: ONE UNUSUAL FEATURE OF THE
VISIT WAS SEPARATE LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SERBIAN PRESIDENCY
FRO GISCARD. RARELY IS ANY ONE YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC
RAISED ABOVE OTHERS BY SERBIAN-FRENCH RELATIONS DATE
FROM BEFORE WORLD WAR I AND ARE WELL REMEMBERED.
HOWEVER, EVEN FOR BREZHNEV VISIT DURING WHICH SERBIAN
LEADERS PLAYED ACTIVE ROLE BECAUSE OF SIMILAR HISTORY
OF SERBIAN-RUSSIAN (AND NONTENEGRIN-RUSSIAN) TIES,
THERE WAS NO SEPARATE FUNCTION HOSTED BY THE SERBS.

15. TITO: FRENCH SAID TITO APPEARED FIT DURING COURSE
OF VISIT. FRENCH MILATT TOLD ALUSNA HE HAD BEEN VERY
CLOSE TO TITO ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND SHOOK HANDS
WITH HIM THREE TIMES. TITO LOOKED ALERT, STRONG AND
HEALTHY, AND HIS HANDSHAKE WAS FIRM. HE DRANK MODERATELY
BUT CONTINUOUSLY DURING RECEPTIONS AND HIS SPEECH
SEEMED UNIMPAIRED. AT ONE POINT, HOWEVER, TITO ADMITTED
TO FAILING EYESIGHT.
SILBERMAN

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